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Abstract
Japan’s new central banking law: A critical view
Ryoichi Mikitani and Patricia Hagan Kuwayama
Japan’s new central banking law, enacted in June 1997 with effect from April 1, 1998,
takes several steps in the direction of assuring greater transparency, independence, and
accountability for the Bank of Japan’s conduct of monetary policy. But with respect to the
other functions of a central bank, it does no such thing. Instead, the approach has been to
leave these traditional banking functions  which are at least  important as monetary policy
narrowly defined – as much as practicable under the control of the government’s finance
ministry. Most disappointing has been the opaque and haphazard process by which the
new law was drafted and passed. This reflects badly on the maturity of Japan’s democratic
institutions, and represents a discouraging start to the government’s “Big Bang” program
of financial reform. However, the law does not, in itself, preclude the emergence of an
independent and successful central bank: That outcome will depend much more on actions
taken by BoJ officials over the next few years.
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I. Overview
The Japanese Diet enacted a new central banking law in June 1997 with effect from April 1, 1998.
Consistent with its stated purposes, the law moves several steps in the direction of assuring
greater transparency, independence, and accountability for the Bank of Japan’s conduct of
monetary policy. But with respect to the other functions of a central bank, it does no such thing.
Instead, the approach has been to leave these traditional banking functions  – which some would
argue are even more important than monetary policy narrowly defined – as much as practicable
under the control of the government’s finance ministry. Perhaps the most disappointing part of the
reform has been the process by which the new law was drafted and passed. Of course a faulty
process does not always yield a bad result, but the process by which major laws are crafted and
approved is an essential pillar of democracy. The logic behind this central banking law’s genesis is
extremely difficult to fathom, a fact that does not raise confidence in the maturity of Japan’s
democratic institutions. Moreover, it represents a discouraging start to the government’s “Big
Bang” program of financial reform. However, the law does not, in itself, preclude the emergence
of an independent and successful central bank. That outcome will depend much more on actions
that BoJ officials will take in the next few years.
II. Background
The Bank of Japan was created in 1882 at the initiative of the then Minister of Finance,
Masayoshi Matsukata. Establishing a central bank was a natural part of the Meiji program for
modernizing Japan’s financial system, and its main objectives were in keeping with those of other
nations that established central banks around that time: to reform the currency system, to establish
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2a single, universally convertible national money, to provide a sound basis for financing the national
government, and to foster the general development of banking. Sixty years later, the Bank of
Japan Decree was replaced by a new Bank of Japan Law, enacted under Japan’s military
government in 1942. The revision added a more modern-sounding mandate for monetary policy,
but – not surprisingly given its origins – it did nothing to alter the central bank’s status as a
creature of the Ministry of Finance.
In contrast with what happened in Postwar Germany – where the central banking law underwent a
thoroughgoing reform in the aftermath of World War II – the Bank of Japan law somehow
escaped the Postwar reform movement that altered so many of Japan’s institutions under the
U.S.-led Occupation. Two later initiatives to reform the central banking law – in the late 1950s
(1957-1960) and again in 1965 – failed to result in legislation. In each instance, the discussion
foundered as attention was concentrated on turf issues – the politics of how powers were to be
distributed within different agencies of the government. The more important question, of how the
institution should be structured in order to yield the best central banking and monetary policy for
the Japanese economy and its people, never made it to the forefront of this public struggle.
The latest, successful effort to enact a new law gained its impetus from failure: Bad monetary
policy decisions were widely blamed for the asset-price “bubble” of the late 1980s and its
subsequent painful bursting. And, following a popular outcry against the need to bail out “non-
bank” housing loan institutions (the so-called jusen) at taxpayers’ expense, the government was
compelled to take some action to improve its institutions for making monetary policy and
overseeing the financial system. A private advisory committee to the Prime Minister (the “Torii
Committee”) was thus organized at Prime Minister Hashimoto’s initiative and its report was
published in November 1996. It then went quickly through the standard legislative process,
undergoing review in closed hearings by the Financial System Study Committee (kinyu seido
chosakai), an advisory committee within the Ministry of Finance. The Committee’s draft report
3was presented in February 1997, was accepted by the Cabinet, and became the basis for the law
passed by both Houses of the Diet a few months later.
Incongruously – considering that the title of the Torii Committee’s report was “Toward an Open
Independence of the Bank of Japan” – much of the drafting was conducted in the private councils
of the ruling LDP under the intellectual leadership of Ministry of Finance staff. Bank of Japan
officials made important contributions, but much of their input was behind the scenes, requesting
changes in a law that had been shaped by others. This diluted the influence of the most
knowledgeable participants in the process. It also meant that the public discussion did not benefit
from participation by Bank of Japan officials, legislators, or outside experts in central banking or
economic policy. The consequences are clearly to be found in the vague and contradictory
language of the two reports and the legislation itself. While it does make a nod at endorsing
independent Bank of Japan monetary policy, the new law falls well behind the contemporary
standard set by the newly created European Central bank, or that of the Federal Reserve in the
United States. It is easy to imagine a different result if there had been a public discussion of
principles: that is, about what a central bank is supposed to be, and what history and international
experience teaches are the conditions fostering successful central banking and monetary policy.
Just as important for the future, the Japanese people missed the opportunity that such a debate
would have presented, to deepen their understanding about the role of their central bank and what
they should expect from it. The importance of this omission should not be underestimated, both
for the future of Japanese democracy and for the environment in which future monetary and
banking policy will be made.
III. What is a central bank?
Historically, central banks have emerged at different times in different countries. The evolution of
their role has been a matter of circumstance more than of plan. The earliest central banks,
including the 17th century Bank of England, had as their main purpose assisting their governments
4with financing. Later, promoting the development of modern banking systems and regulating the
issue of currency became important goals. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the experience of
repeated financial panics shifted focus once again, to the need for central banks to act as a
stabilizing “lender of last resort.” Since international flows of specie and (later) currency often
played a critical role in destabilizing banking systems as well as in government finance,
international monetary operations inevitably became another aspect of the role of central banks
from early on. These three main functions – which nowadays we would characterize as the central
bank’s roles as banker to the government, as bankers’ bank (center of the payments system and
lender of last resort), and as international monetary authority – have come to reside in a single
institution, the central bank, after a long historical evolution in virtually every modern economy.
The responsibility for something called “monetary policy,” in contrast, is a relatively recent
notion. It, too, arose not by intent but out of experience and necessity. Especially after central
banks became non-profit institutions with the monopoly of currency issue and with responsibility
for liquidity provision to stem panics, it became obvious that their actions had macroeconomic
implications that must be taken into account. Central bankers found themselves having to regulate
the overall liquidity supply in response to seasonal and balance-of-payments movements in
ordinary times, and to sudden interruptions at times of stress. Over time, they also learned to look
past these short-term operations (or “defensive” operations as they were once called by central
bankers at the New York Fed), in order also to “dynamically” monitor the medium-term trends
that they were fostering in the economy as a whole. 2 It was by this progression that central banks
came to concern themselves with what we now think of as “monetary policy”: a fourth role of the
central bank, regulating the overall supply of money and credit in order to stabilize the value of
the payments medium and thus contribute to orderly development of the economy as a whole.
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5This function was not consciously envisaged for the early central banks, nor even as late as 1913
when the Federal Reserve was created. The Federal Reserve Act, in fact, set up the U.S. central
bank for the purposes of providing an elastic currency, a means of rediscounting commercial
paper, and more effective supervision of banking, and for “other purposes.” The excuse for
monetary policy lay only in this standard legislative afterthought of “other purposes.” But as Allen
Sproul, one of America’s leading central bankers, once said, “the ‘other purposes’ have long since
stolen the show.”3 The omission of monetary policy from the Fed's charter has since been
remedied by the Full Employment Act of 1946 and the Full Employment and Balanced Growth
Act (popularly known as the “Humphrey-Hawkins” law) of 1978. Central banks with more recent
charters, including the Bank of Japan under its 1942 law, are explicitly charged with guiding
credit provision in support of the orderly development of the economy as a whole: that is, with
making monetary policy. But whether legislated or not, this role has arisen naturally everywhere
as a corollary of central banks’ original banking functions. The logical “glue” that holds all four of
these functions together is evident from the fact that central banks have evolved in more or less
the same way in every modern economy across the globe – not as the theoretical creation of some
economist or bureaucrat but out of historical trial and error to meet the needs of a modern
monetary economy.
IV. Problems in the new Bank of Japan law
If the four functions – as the government’s bank, the bankers’ bank, international monetary
authority, and maker of monetary policy – never conflicted with one another, it would not be a
difficult task to outline the desirable structure of a central bank. But in reality these often have to
be balanced against each other, and judging the tradeoffs between them is an essential challenge of
central banking policy. Many of the problems in the new BoJ law stem from the designers’
attempt to impose an impractical separation of “monetary policy” from the other responsibilities.
The law recognizes (albeit with some inappropriate conditions) the BoJ’s independence with
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6respect to monetary policy but not the other functions. The law is also “limitationist” in structure:
that is, specifying in detail those matters that belong to the BoJ’s domain and leaving all others
implicitly to the Ministry of Finance. A third fundamental problem, at the core of much of the
law’s confusion, is the failure to clarify the Bank of Japan’s position under the Constitution:
whether it is responsible directly to the Diet, or to the Cabinet as a separate part of the executive
branch, or indirectly as a subordinate organ of the Ministry of Finance.
A. Separation of monetary policy from central banking
The fashion for endorsing central bank “independence” has captured academic and journalistic
attention in recent years, but the public discussion has focused almost entirely on the narrow area
of monetary policy. This is understandable, since the other functions of a central bank tend to be
ignored – much like the plumbing in a beautifully designed building – so long as they are
conducted properly and work well. But the fact is – as was well described by Robert Roosa more
than 40 years ago – that the more prosaic, or “defensive” functions of a central bank are usually
conducted side by side with, and using the same tools as, the more glamorous matters of
monetary policy. Attempting to separate “monetary policy” from other responsibilities of the
central bank ultimately leads to contradiction and ambiguity that undermine the legislation’s
purpose of setting a clear mandate for an independent and accountable central bank.
Perhaps the oddest reflection of this schizophrenic approach is in the provisions for budgeting.
The law (Article 51) requires the BoJ to prepare a budget for “current expenditures,” defined as
those not related to “currency and monetary control” (tsuka oyobi kinyu no chosetsu, the law’s
phrase for what we are calling “monetary policy”), and submit it for the Minister of Finance’s
approval before the beginning of the fiscal year. Since in reality there is no way to separate
activities that are and are not related to monetary policy, the BoJ must be expected to submit
either virtually its entire budget, or none at all, for Ministerial approval. However, the decision –
which must necessarily be arbitrary – on which expenditures should be included is to be decided
7by a government Cabinet order (seir i). In this provision – as in many other parts of the law – the
meaningful support to BoJ independence comes from transparency: The MoF must publicly
explain both the proposed budget and its reasons if it decides to disapprove. This may in fact
seriously crimp the MoF’s ability to dictate to the Bank of Japan, but it does not constitute
recognition of the principle of central bank independence. It would have been more in keeping
with the law’s stated purposes – not to speak of practice in the United States and other advanced
countries – to provide for the BoJ’s budgetary accountability via publication and an independent
review of its financial statements.
The law’s provision for BoJ appointments also seems to reflect this division: The executives
(Article 21) are to be: the Governor, two Deputy Governors, six “Deliberative Members” of the
Policy Board, up to three Auditors, up to six Executive Directors, and an unspecified number of
Advisors. The Governor, Deputy Governors, and Deliberative Members – making up the Policy
Board which is charged with all important decisions on monetary and central banking policy – are
to be appointed by the Cabinet with the consent of both Houses of the Diet. The Auditors are also
appointed by the Cabinet, but the Executive Directors and Advisors are appointed by the Minister
of Finance on the recommendation of the Board. The latter are charged with “administering the
business of the bank,” and this presumably reflects the notion that operational banking matters are
done on behalf of the MoF rather than independently by the BoJ. Again, since the Policy Board
must act on any matter of importance and is to include at least some outside members (the law
provides that the Deliberative Members should be “experts on the economy or finance or persons
with other academic background”), increased transparency may constrain MoF officials from
interfering by use of appointments as they have in the past. But the law’s language itself has done
nothing to clarify the independent role of the BoJ.
8B. Independence in conducting monetary policy
“Currency and monetary control” is the one area where it is explicitly recognized that the Bank of
Japan should have some autonomy. Even here, though, the law eschews the use of the word
“independence” (dokuritsu) – the term that was almost always used in public discussion of this
matter up to the 1997 drafting  in favor of the vaguer phrase “respect for the Bank of Japan’s
autonomy” (jishusei). Article 3 states that the BoJ’s autonomy shall be respected, and that it shall
“clarify to the public the content of its decisions, as well as the process of decision making.” In
both cases, this provision is explicitly limited to the BoJ’s activities with respect to currency and
monetary control.
Some of the specific provisions about monetary policy are vague at best. Article 4, on the
relationship with the government, says that: “recognizing the fact that currency and monetary
control is a component of overall economic policy, the Bank of Japan shall always keep close
contact with the government and exchange views sufficiently, so that its monetary policy and the
basic stance of the government’s economic policy shall be mutually harmonious.” There is nothing
wrong about this as a generalization, but its concrete interpretation is hazardous. Historically,
language of this sort has meant that Bank of Japan monetary policy should accommodate itself to
whatever economic policies the government had set. “Close contact” has meant accepting
direction from the MoF except when BoJ officials succeeded in persuading them of their own
point of view. Bank of Japan officials – in contrast with their counterparts in Germany or the
United States – have not permitted themselves to comment publicly on fiscal policy even when its
inappropriate stance placed monetary policy choices under unbearable constraint.
Even if one believes that the BoJ and MoF will be equal partners from here on, Article 4 embodies
a theory of jointly determined fiscal-and-monetary “policy mix” that may not be appropriate in
today’s world. Of course, exchange of opinions and coordination of policy actions between the
government and central bank are necessary to avoid contradictory effects of divergent policies
9that might be taken by the two bodies independently. But in practice, the views of the Ministry of
Finance or of politicians have often dominated public discussion and often prevailed over the
central bankers’ views. Based on this historical experience as well as on economic analysis, many
experts believe that fiscal and monetary policy should operate independently, with separate pre-
assigned goals and separate instruments. Indeed, Article 2 does assign the BoJ responsibility for a
single target, price stability – rather than for growth or full employment and price stability, as
U.S. legislation does for the Federal Reserve. The law thus implicitly accepts the contemporary
view that central banks should address themselves directly to price stability goals alone, even
though the ultimate purpose is – jointly with the government – to promote sustainable growth
over time in output and employment. Specifically, Article 2 says that BoJ monetary policy should
“aim, through the pursuit of price stability, at contributing to the sound development of the
national economy.”
Also counter to the stated goal of independence is the provision (Article 19) that certain
government representatives may attend and participate in Bank of Japan Policy Board meetings.
The government representatives are allowed to offer opinions and proposals on any item placed
on the Board’s agenda, but not to vote. Similar provisions are not unknown abroad, but the trend
is to eliminate this kind of government participation. Most relevant is the newly created European
Central Bank, which in many other respects has been modeled on the German Bundesbank, but
which does not retain the past German practice of occasional attendance by the Finance Minister.
In the United States it has been over 60 years since the Treasury Secretary was taken off the
Federal Reserve Board, and nearly 50 since the so-called “Accord” established the Fed’s
independence in setting interest rates. But even in the United States, deep sensitivities would be
raised if there were the merest suggestion of an Administration presence at internal Fed meetings.
Given the Bank of Japan’s history of subordination to the MoF, the risk of a chilling effect must
be all the greater. The inclusion of this provision thus seems directly contrary to the Law’s stated
intent, of fostering a newly independent central bank. Adding insult to injury, the law actually
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provides that the Minister of Finance and the Director of the Economic Planning Agency can
attend themselves or designate staff members to represent them. Even in the rare instance when a
government representation might be warranted, it surely should be the Minister himself who
would engage in such meetings with the Policy Board, which is his counterpart as the highest
policymaking authority of the Bank of Japan.
C. Payments system and lender-of-last-resort role
Article 1 of the law establishes two purposes for the BoJ: The first is currency and monetary
control, with the goal of price stability, as already discussed. The second is described as: “to
ensure smooth fund settlement among banks and other financial institutions, and thereby
contribute to the maintenance of the orderly financial system.” This gives recognition to the BoJ’s
role as center of the payments system, as well as its involvement in maintaining the “financial
order” (shinyo chitsujo). But, when these phrases are viewed along with the specific provisions
for emergency lending (in Articles 37 and 38), there seems to be an alarming lack of distinction
between the central bank’s responsibility for protecting the payments system and the
government’s possible interest in assistance lending to individual institutions.
Following standard principles that go all the way back to Bagehot, it is widely accepted that the
central bank’s lending should be to solvent institutions only, and should be not assistance lending
but liquidity provided at market rates and on receipt of adequate collateral. Of course, this
principle is easier to state than to apply. In times of financial market stress – the most likely times
for this issue to arise – a bank can quickly change from “solvent” to “insolvent” at current market
valuation of its assets. (As an example, experts still argue about whether Continental Illinois
should have been bailed out in 1984, even though it turned out to be a profitable investment for
the authorities. But U.S. law does require the Federal Reserve to take collateral, and to shift
lending of this sort to a higher-interest-rate basis under its Extended Financing Facility whenever
credit has to be extended for more than a few weeks.) The delicacy of judgments involved is what
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makes it all the more important that the central bank be empowered – and obliged – to act
independently on banking principles. Since there may be macroeconomic consequences of a
sudden liquidity injection to prevent systemic collapse, and the central bank may need to offset
these in its later “dynamic” money market operations, this precisely illustrates why decisions to
act as lender of last resort to protect the payments system must be made by the same independent
entity – the central bank – that sets monetary policy. But instead of recognizing this principle, the
law specifies that the BoJ can act on its own only in the very narrowest of conditions: when
financial institutions “unexpectedly experience a temporary shortage of funds for payment due to
accidental causes including computer system problems...” (Article 37).
Moreover, it says (Article 38) that the Ministry of Finance may request the Bank of Japan to lend
in much broader circumstances: “when it is believed to be necessary for the maintenance of the
orderly financial system including the case where the state of the business operations and property
of a financial institution is believed to cause a serious problem in the orderly financial system.” It
does not say whether the BoJ can refuse to comply with such a request, nor what conditions it can
or must set. This provision would not even, therefore, disallow a repeat of the 1996 Jusenbailout
– in which the BoJ was required to lend to a non-bank, an entity with no critical direct connection
to the payments system, on concessional terms, despite the nearly universal view among experts
that this was not a suitable operation for a central bank. This muddying of the line between central
bank and government responsibilities is unfortunately characteristic of the entire spirit of this law,
which thus perpetuates exactly the kind of ambiguity that has kept the Bank of Japan from
establishing its independence and accountability in the past.
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D. Government finances
The central bank’s role as the government’s bank is the source of some classical dilemmas of
central banking. Virtually every government has, at times, pressured its central bank into bending
its interest-rate policy in order to facilitate cheap financing for its own activities. Indeed, the very
concept of “monetary policy” presumes a separation of interest-rate setting from debt-
management decisions that would not have existed for the earliest central banks, before the
development of modern financial systems with open markets for government debt. Even in recent
times, many examples can be found when the desire to fix rates paid on government issues
interfered with the central bank’s guidance of money market rates in line with macroeconomic
balance. In the United States, this was precisely the subject of the fight that ended in the landmark
1951 “Accord,” and the later steps to end the Fed’s obligation to “even keel” Treasury refunding
rates during the 1970s.  (The 1951 “Accord” was reached after a bitter fight between the Truman
Administration and the members of the Federal Reserve Board. The minutes of a meeting between
President Truman and the Board members were made public by Governor Eccles in order to
protest the President’s one-sided interpretation of the agreement in favor of the Administration.
The matter was resolved when the U.S. Congress and the public supported the Federal Reserve.)
Accordingly, it has long been conventional wisdom that central banks should be constrained by
limits or collateral requirements for their own note issue, or prohibited from directly financing the
government’s debt, in order to protect the impartiality of monetary policy. Japan’s new law has
dropped the previous upper limits set by the MoF for BoJ note issue, a change that in itself is a
reasonable adaptation to contemporary reality and in line with practice in other countries. But it
provides no protection against the distortion of BoJ monetary policy by passive operations to
monetize government issue. Far from prohibiting off-market financing of the government, the law
simply directs the BoJ to lend under broadly defined circumstances without any reference to the
policy tradeoffs involved. Article 34 says that the Bank of Japan can make loans without collateral
to the national government, or purchase or underwrite its bonds, within limits set by the Diet
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under the Fiscal Law. It further provides (in paragraph 4) that the Bank of Japan can subscribe or
underwrite financial bills and other bills issued for stopgap financing.
The latter is of more than academic importance, because it appears to endorse the practice of
having the Bank of Japan directly purchase the government’s short-term Financing Bills, issued at
the Ministry of Finance’s discretion, at below-market rates. (These bills are discounted at a rate
below the Official Discount Rate, which itself is close to, and sometimes lower, than the rate for
overnight funds available in the call market.) The Financing Bills currently amount to around ¥37
trillion (outstanding as of May1998), a substantial part of the Bank of Japan’s overall liquidity
provision. The Bank of Japan has proposed for some time that they should be issued to the open
money market, not accepted directly by the BoJ, a suggestion that conforms to widely accepted
principles of central banking. But the Ministry until now has not agreed, presumably because it did
not want to add to the government’s debt-servicing costs. It appears that the MoF is finally giving
way on this. It has announced a plan to begin public tender of Financing Bills in fiscal 1999,
ending their off-market acceptance by the BoJ.4 T stated reason is the hope that market-priced
FBs will become an attractive money-management vehicle for foreign investors (including central
banks) and thus help to boost the yen. But, once again, it is disappointing that the newly drafted
BoJ law did nothing to require this change as a step toward rational central banking, instead
leaving it entirely to the MoF’s discretion.
E. Foreign exchange and international monetary operations
The international monetary functions of a central bank are perhaps the hardest to define, since in
all major countries governments play a leading role in setting exchange-rate policy and any treaty-
related obligations in the financial realm. Also, institutional arrangements vary widely: As an
example, the foreign exchange reserves that must be used in international operations are legally
owned by the government in some countries; in others they are the property of the central bank.
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In the United States and Japan, somewhat unusually, both parties independently own portions of
the foreign reserves – a situation that seems to lend itself to having both the central bank and the
government empowered to undertake such operations.5 Many ce tral banks conduct all of their
governments’ routine foreign exchange operations (for example, to pay for embassies or other
operations abroad) as a matter of law. The U.S. and Japanese situations are unusual here, as well,
in that both governments may and do use commercial banks for many of their non-policy-related
transactions.
None of these institutional details seem to matter much, however, relative to the common
realities: First, governments are responsible for underlying exchange-rate policy (including setting
parities where those exist), but if a central bank is in charge of interest-rate policy then it controls
the primary policy tool that can be used to carry out such policy. Second, a central bank must be
able to operate with some degree of autonomy in the international financial markets in order to
carry out responsibilities for both its payments system and its currency. As in the domestic realm,
this discussion tends to be muddied by too exclusive a focus on the matter of exchange-r t
policy as opposed to more operational activities of the central bank. The confusion is all the
greater because of the strong views that many individuals hold about exchange-rate policy itself:
some believing that parities should be permanently fixed, and others that monetary authorities
should not intervene at all to set exchange rates. Presumably to avoid such objections, the BoJ
law avoids the word “currency” (tsuka)in Article 2 where it sets the rationale for central bank’s
monetary policy, using the term “price stability” (bukka no antei) instead.
But exchange markets are part of a seamless web of global money markets, and a central bank
inevitably finds itself involved in all if it is involved in one. This has always been true, since the
value of a central bank’s note issue – the currency – cannot be stabilized in some exclusively
                                         
5 As of May 1998, the Bank of Japan owned ¥3.15 trillion at book value (probably about $22 billion) or about 11%
of the foreign exchange reserves, which totaled $194 billion at that time. The Federal Reserve, as of February
1998, owned 55% of U.S. foreign exchange reserves: $17.2 billion out of a total of $31.2 billion.
15
“domestic” sense if its external value is unstable. Even more importantly, a central bank must
sometimes operate in international markets for reasons that have nothing to do with exchange rate
policy, but which instead are connected to its role as lender of last resort. An example that springs
to mind is Charles Coombs’ account of the events following the Kennedy assassination in 1963.6
Coombs describes his solitary decision, as operational head of foreign exchange operations at the
New York Federal Reserve, to undertake immediate and (by then standards) massive offerings of
foreign currencies against the dollar. The decision came out of the obvious and urgent need to
sustain confidence in the continuity of U.S. policies, when the dollar presented itself as a first line
of attack in any panic. There were no bids for the dollar in the moments after the Kennedy news
burst over the wires on that Friday afternoon. And, without action by the central bank, the dollar
could have plummeted into this vacuum contributing to a dangerous atmosphere of panic in
financial markets generally. A less dramatic, but conceptually similar situation occurred in May
1984 when Continental Illinois was rumored to be having difficulty funding itself in the Euro
markets. The quick decision to purchase dollars clearly had no connection to exchange-rate policy
– the dollar was officially viewed as overvalued at the time – but everything to do with keeping
payments going and shoring up confidence in the U.S. financial system.
Central bankers from any other country could cite comparable experiences. But these U.S.
examples make a few points. In the U.S. system, both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve have
independent authority to intervene in exchange markets, but neither would normally choose to
operate without the other’s cooperation. In emergency situations like these, the Federal Reserve
does sometimes go ahead without waiting for time-consuming consultations. The Kennedy
episode was a rare, but illustrative extreme: Coombs describes committing borrowed resources
under the Federal Reserve swap lines with foreign central banks before he had been able to reach
his counterparts in either Europe or Washington. Once he did get to this, time zone constraints
prompted him to call the European central bankers first and the Treasury last. The importance of
                                         
6 Coombs (1976), pp. 92-106.
16
his established working relationships with operational counterparts in several central banks was
also brought out by this account.
But at least as important is another point that – vital as American central bankers believe their
independent authority to be – ultimately, such operations must have the full support of the
government behind them to be successful. The case for autonomous central bank action is
strongest in a lender-of-last-resort-type operation like those mentioned above. But it is precisely
in those cases that any appearance of disunity between the central bank and the government
would threaten the basic objective of maintaining confidence in the country’s currency and
financial system. So, while the Federal Reserve has sometimes expressed dissent from Treasury
foreign exchange operations by refusing to join them (a fact that becomes public within a few
months in the Fed’s mandated reports), and jealously defends its right to operate on its own when
the need is urgent, the operational autonomy of the Fed in no way denies the need for close
coordination with the government. The result, in the U.S. case, is an implicit recognition of what
Paul Volcker has called a “mutual veto” over exchange-market operations: Neither the Treasury
nor the Fed can realistically try to achieve much with operations undertaken over the other’s
objection.7
Unfortunately, the new Bank of Japan law does nothing to lay out such a partnership between the
Japanese central bank and the Japanese government in international matters. Instead, it seems to
reinforce the traditional expectation that the Bank of Japan is essentially a “manservant” of the
Ministry of Finance when it comes to foreign operations. Articles 40 and 41 specify that the Bank
of Japan can operate in all the usual ways – conducting foreign currency transactions, handling
business with foreign central banks and international institutions, and for the usual purposes of
currency stabilization or international cooperation – but in each case acting as the government’s
agent, or conducting business designated by the Minister of Finance on his request or approval.
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Japan is no different from any other modern economy in that it is the central bank whose day-to-
day responsibilities keep it in close touch with the markets, and with operating-level counterparts
in foreign central banks, making it the party that is both motivated and prepared to act quickly and
effectively when the payments network comes under stress. And as financial markets become
more and more interconnected, it is increasingly unrealistic to think of the “payments” network as
divided between domestic and international components. The central bank must be prepared to
act in both, and it should be expected to take the initiative when needed rather than being
subordinated as a mere agent, hamstrung by requirements to obtain “requests” or “approval” from
another party.
It may be, as with other aspects of the law, that this unfortunate phrasing will not keep the Bank
of Japan from operating as it needs to in practice. Ultimately, the BoJ’s role will evolve through
experience and depend on the behavior of both its own and government officials. But the failure
to spell out a realistic division of labor does have consequences at both policy and operational
levels. At a policy level, Bank of Japan officials have long been extraordinarily reluctant to
recognize the foreign exchange aspect of their monetary policy decisions, at least in public
statements. This problem exists to some extent in all central banks, which naturally view any
admission of exchange-rate considerations as a potential Trojan horse for the government to enter
their interest-rate deliberations. Federal Reserve officials certainly have always been a little
paranoid about admitting concern for the dollar: One, in the 1970s, compared the risks to those of
the Fed’s pre-Accord subservient pegging of Treasury debt prices.8 Volcke ’s account of the
Plaza discussions in 1985 brings home the same fear of being “locked into” to an essentially
political commitment to target exchange rates.9 And so did the events of the fall of 1989, when
one FOMC meeting actually set down as a reason for its decision not to lower interest rates, the
                                         
8 Maisel (1973), p. 208.
9 Volcker and Gyohten, p. 245.
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FOMC’s desire not to be seen as influenced by a G-7 Finance Ministers’ agreement to curb the
dollar.10
But Federal Reserve officials, perhaps reflecting greater confidence in their recognized
independence, are nowhere near as reluctant as BoJ officials to mention exchange-rate
considerations – which after all do affect both economic activity and prices at home – as one of
the influences on interest-rate policy. It is hard to know whether this reticence confuses the BoJ’s
internal policy debate. But there can be no doubt that it confuses public understanding of the
BoJ’s actions. And public understanding is absolutely essential – both in the short run, for
effective policy implementation which depends on the financial markets’ response, and in the
longer run for preserving the central bank’s independent standing vis a vis the government.
At an operational level, the ambiguous authority of the central bank tends to limit its choice of
instruments. European central banks, as an example, have traditionally made extensive use of
foreign exchange swaps for adjusting liquidity in their domestic money markets, while the Bank of
Japan and the Federal Reserve have never done so. Foreign exchange swaps are an interest-rate
operation in economic terms, but a foreign currency operation in law, and one reason that these
two central banks have not used them is undoubtedly the fear that they might come under
government purview in a way that other money-market operations do not. This is not a serious
practical problem: The U.S. money markets have long been far better developed than U.S. foreign
exchange markets. And the Bank of Japan has always had effective day-to-day control of very
short-term interest rates via central bank lending operations (the discount window having been
until 1995 a primary, and highly efficient, method of day-to-day liquidity adjustment). And it now
has a variety of money market operations including repurchase arrangements that it can use. But
the restriction does seem a little silly, and could conceivably become a practical constraint in a
                                         
10 FOMC (1989).
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future world – given the trend toward globalization which is blurring distinctions between
“international” and “domestic” market instruments in all areas of finance.
F. Accountability and reporting
One of the great missed opportunities of this legislation was to clarify the position of the Bank of
Japan under the Constitution. Japan’s Constitution establishes three main branches of
government: the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. The Torii Committee, to judge from
the fragmentary public record of its deliberations,11 took it as given that the Bank of Japan is part
of the executive branch which, under Article 65 of the Constitution, belongs under the control of
the Cabinet. But much of the discussion in Japan has centered on the idea that the Bank of Japan
belongs to the “administrative” realm (a vague concept called seifu, which is not mentioned
anywhere in the Constitution) and thus must report to the Cabinet through a responsible Ministry
– that is, the Ministry of Finance – rather than directly. The constitutional issue was in fact
debated during the previous discussion of a new Bank of Japan law, in the 1960s, and resolved in
favor of the view that the Constitution does allow the Bank of Japan to report directly to the
Cabinet. But this appears to have been entirely forgotten in the latest round, at least as far as can
be told from the public record. Newspaper reports in fact claimed that the law’s wording was
guided by concern that calling for Bank of Japan “independence” would be unconstitutional,
although this flies in the face of the established conclusion by legal scholars.
Whether out of confusion, or based on a new interpretation of the Constitution (with an
astonishing lack of debate), the practical implication of this is found in the reporting provisions of
Article 54 of the new law. Entitled “Reporting to the Diet”, this section sets down a welcome
requirement of accountability by requiring the Bank of Japan to report approximately every six
                                         
11 Central Bank Study Committee minutes published in the October 1996 issue of Kinyu magazine (minutes of the
Committee’s meeting on September 11, 1996). The Committee’s minutes refer alternately to s ifu and naikaku
(Cabinet), but the assumption seems to be that the BoJ can operate lawfully only under the close supervision of
MoF officials.
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months on all of the Policy Board’s policy decisions and on operations to carry them out. But the
law instructs the BoJ to submit its report “to the Diet through the Minister of Finance”. It is hard
to see what purpose is served by making the Bank of Japan report indirectly, other than to
underscore that it is not an independent agency with responsibility directly to the Cabinet.
V. What to expect?
In sum, the new Law, despite its stated purpose of establishing an independent central bank, is full
of restrictions that – certainly symbolically, and possibly materially – deny the BoJ’s right to
operate in markets, set its own budget, or frame policy as an autonomous agent. Still, flawed as
the legislation is, it is not a reason for despair about the Bank of Japan’s future role. Historically,
legal language has been important, but it is not the all-or-nothing key to a central bank’s
independence or success. The Federal Reserve is a good example: The 1913 Federal Reserve Act
was enacted under the gold standard and its operating guideline was the real bills doctrine, two
principles that do not necessarily yield consistent prescriptions for policy. The Fed’s present
position has been hard-won in fights over actual policy decisions, and owes much to the events
and personalities involved. (This includes not only central bankers, but also Congressional leaders
like Senator Paul Douglas from Illinois: who helped conclude the 1951 dispute by calling for the
Federal Reserve to “gird its legal loins and fulfill the responsibilities which I believe the Congress
intended it to have.”12) Most importantly, the Fed’s standing has been bolstered by a relatively
successful record of policy judgments in recent decades, gaining it a legitimacy in voters’ eyes that
would help to protect it against any Administration attempt to meddle. The original Federal
Reserve Act is been supplemented over time by legislation that sought to adapt to contemporary
economic and social reality: Among the most important are the Banking Act of 1935, the
Employment Act of 1946, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978. Similarly, the
German Bundesbank’s often-cited independence owes much to past success and public trust, and
not just to legislation.
                                         
12 Sproul collection, p. 64.
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It would have been useful if the new law had helped to point the way, but in any circumstance it is
bound to be Bank of Japan officials themselves that face the essential challenge over the next few
years. They need to seize their independence – not expect it to be handed to them, which it clearly
has not been – and to use it wisely. The catch-phrases of “transparency” and “accountability” –
while not, unfortunately, applied to the drafting of the law itself – provide a basis for the BoJ to
challenge interfering governments and to utilize informed public debate to garner support of good
policies (both its own and those of the government).
The BoJ already has begun making active use of this opportunity: expanding its internet “web”
site to include a variety of informative data and analysis; making its economic analyses accessible
through frequent outlook publications; and publishing remarkably frank and detailed accounts of
the Policy Board’s twice-monthly deliberations. The new Governor, Masaru Hayami, has been
more forthright than his predecessors in his comments on government policies that impinge on
central banking – including fiscal policy as well as policies regarding banking problems and the
financial system. The government’s appointments to the new Policy Board have had a heavy
admixture of politics – some qualified more by constituency than by expertise. But the nine-
member Board now has two outside economists and two industrialists who have already increased
the depth and range of public debate on monetary policy – even offering dissenting proposals for
the record over their individual names. Within the constraints that any central bank must place on
its official statements, the BoJ thus seems to be moving away from the Japanese tradition of a
silently subordinate central bank – a tradition that kept BoJ officials from weighing in even on the
main issues in its own central banking law during the 1996-1997 debate. In operating matters, BoJ
officials seem to have finally won their argument with the MoF about market issue of Financing
Bills, despite the lack of support from the new Law. And they appear to be pushing the envelope
of permitted independent action in other areas as well – one example being the investment of the
BoJ’s own foreign exchange reserves.
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These signs are hopeful, but it will take some years to see whether the quality of monetary policy
decisions actually improves under the new regime. A great deal depends on changes that the new
leadership will make in the BoJ itself, reorienting the behavior of a staff who were trained in the
old regime. The success of internal reforms that the Bank of Japan has already begun undertaking
(some long before the new law was even conceived), in order to equip itself for a new role and
accountability, will thus be critically important. The hardest of all will be changing how staff are
selected, motivated and rewarded. The choice is between (a) becoming an ever-more sleepy
institution, attracting young people who are risk-averse and expect to be rewarded for keeping
quiet and doing what they are told, and (b) attracting and keeping public-spirited staff who will
argue, even with their bosses, about what the central bank should do and who will go elsewhere if
they are not stimulated and empowered. Since the old-style prestige and amakudari wards13 are
withering under the hot wind of public criticism, the first of these trends is already in place;
changing to the second one requires strenuous effort on the part of management. But if it makes
this effort successfully, this could be a fine opportunity for the BoJ to enhance its standing and
effectiveness. After all, it may be better prepared for change than many of Japan’s government
ministries, which face the same problems in possibly even greater degree. One thing is certain:
The next few years will be interesting and important to watch.
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